accounts of the Holocaust restitution cases, a set of related mega-class action suits brought in the late 1990s. Both authors chronicle the efforts of elderly Holocaust victims and their supporters to obtain a remedy for wrongs suffered during the Nazi era and afterwards. For these victims, the litigation weapon of choice was the class action lawsuit. With the aid of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Holocaust-era claims went forward as a collective effort.
Both authors analyze the Holocaust suits and settlement negotiations thoughtfully and in great detail. Both acknowledge that the class action device contributed much to the overall financial success of the Holocaust restitution movement.1 Both are quick to acknowledge, however, that class action litigation likely would not have produced results for Holocaust survivors absent other advocacy efforts: efforts in Congress, in state legislatures, in state regulatory bodies, at the highest levels of the Clinton administration, and in the court of public opinion.2 Simultaneous effort on all fronts enabled Holocaust survivors, after fifty years of being rebuffed in Europe, finally to sit across the settlement table from European governments and the world's leading corporations.
The success of this endeavor was so impressive (or at least perceived that way) that it has drawn much attention from other victim reparations movements. African Americans are encouraged by the Holocaust slave labor settlement.3 Armenians take heart from the Holocaust insurance and banking litigation.4 South African victims of Apartheid rely upon these cases as a bellwether, an indication that there is momentum in favor of holding corporations accountable for human rights violations.5 All view the result in the Holocaust cases as a (Vol. 102:1152 broad collective victory: cases litigated on a class basis, settled with few class members opting out,6 propelled forward by the efforts of the collective's main advocacy organizations and supplemented by broad support among the Jewish collective at large.7 All of which leads Bazyler and Eizenstat to speculate that there may be a "Holocaust restitution model" for other victims of past injustice.8
Notwithstanding the authors' optimism and the number of new human rights class actions that have been filed in the past few years, other groups should proceed with caution. Before any "model" is identified and followed, the limitations of the Holocaust restitution cases need to be acknowledged. Chief among these limitations is that those cases were more about individual justice than collective justice. Little was awarded in the way of remedies to address injuries suffered by the collective. Nearly all the money generated by the settlements was paid out in the form of individual cash awards. Proposals for group-oriented remedies were rejected. Other victim groups should take note. Seeking collective remedies through the Holocaust model is risky business.
I. DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SCHOLAR AND THE W ASHINGTON INSIDER
Disputes arising from the Holocaust have been in courts (here and elsewhere) for sixty years. Nearly all of these proceedings have focused on individual perpetrators and how they acted at a time when they possessed extraordinary power over others and where the "others" were people that statutes, decrees, or judicial practice had put outside the law's protection.9 From the trials at Nuremberg in the 1940s to those in national courts in later decades, Holocaust cases had familiar themes: good and evil, obeying orders, personal ambition, and the bureaucratic mindset.
The class action suits filed in the Eastern District of New York, beginning with the Swiss banks case in 1996, were different. The defendants were corporate entities, not individuals. The complaints were more about profit than malice. The causes of action arose not merely from events during the War, but also after it. The defendants were not those who had conceived of and carried out genocide. Daimler Benz had not devised the Final Solution, but it had worked with the Nazi regime to keep its assembly lines filled with slave laborers. Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) had not liquidated the Lodz Ghetto, but it had looted the assets of its Jewish depositors trapped there and in other ghettos across Poland. After the War, SBC had worked in coordination with other Swiss banks to prevent heirs from claiming the assets of family members who had perished. In other words, the Holocaust restitution cases of the 1990s opened the door to ever wider circles of complicity. Had the Swiss banks acted with the support of the Swiss Government and the larger Swiss business community? Did wrongdoing occur on the other side of the Atlantic among America's blue-chip corporations, some of whom had close ties to Nazi Germany? The cases raised expectations of collective reliefremedies not only for individual victims but for the collectives of which they are a part. If the defendants had acted collectively, had not the victims suffered collectively?
Both Eizenstat and Bazyler lead us to consider these questions, but they lead us along two different paths. Imperfect Justice is partly a memoir and partly a diplomatic primer from a longtime Washington insider who became U.S. Ambassador to the European Union in 1993. As the Clinton administration came into office, Eizenstat (prompted by Richard Holbrooke )10 seized upon a window of opportunity for nudging the new governments of Eastern Europe to deal with their wartime past and the many properties that had been confiscated from religious orders, private associations, and other components of civil society. In the case of churches, the culprits were the post-War Communist governments. In the case of Jewish properties, there were two culprits. Synagogues and cemeteries had been seized and destroyed during the Nazi period. After the War, these properties were then expropriated by Communist governments.
When Eizenstat begins discussions with the post-Communist governments, knotty issues quickly surface: Who now held these properties? To whom should they be returned? Did a tiny community of elderly Holocaust survivors have the resources to restore and maintain these properties? Should the properties instead be transferred to international Jewish organizations functioning in essence as trustees? Could these latter organizations, many based in 10. Holbrooke at the time was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. U.S. government policy in the former Communist countries was that property restitution was to be part of a "broader U.S. policy to encourage the rule of law, respect for property rights, [and] tolerance toward minorities." EIZENSTAT p. 23. [Vol. 102:1152 New York or Jerusalem, see eye-to-eye with local Jewish communities?
Over the course of six years, Eizenstat is drawn steadily deeper into these and other questions of Holocaust restitution. Like a freelance photographer, he carries his Holocaust portfolio with him from post to post, from the U.S. Embassy in Brussels to the Commerce Department to the State Department and finally to the number two spot at Treasury. It is difficult to think of another executive branch official in recent memory who invested so much effort and so much of his reputation in trying to resolve claims among private parties, most of whom were not even U.S. citizens.11
Holocaust Justice, on the other hand, is the work of a human rights lawyer and scholar. Bazyler's narrative is grounded in the cases themselves -their theories of liability and their implications for the larger field of international human rights. In this, his basic perspective and Eizenstat's are quite different. Eizenstat repeatedly lets us know that he has little patience for class action litigation in general and plaintiff-side class action lawyers in particular.12 Bazyler, on the other hand, is a sympathetic observer and perhaps even a fellow traveler.13 When he takes someone to task, it is the defendants and their counsel, especially over delay and deceit.14 Bazyler also puts some distance between himself and the views of prominent Jewish intellectuals reluctant to be engaged in monetizing the Holocaust.15 That, in his view, is not the chief danger. Rather it is in acquiescing to a human rights regime that lacks real remedies. For him, the hero of the drama is the American judicial system. Unlike tribunals elsewhere, U.S. courts stood ready to do justice for vast numbers of victims, even those who were not U.S. citizens.16 For Eizenstat, the heroes are not the 11. As Eizenstat puts it: "There was no precedent in American history for such a legal negotiation by the U.S. government with private companies and for intervening this way in present and future private lawsuits." P. 257.
12. EIZENSTAT p. 75 ("The class-action lawyers who entered the scene were a witches' brew of egos and mutual jealousies, greatly complicating my responsibility to keep the Swiss affair from careening out of diplomatic control"); id. p. 77 ("The lawyers were not in it to find historical truth. Most were in it for the money.").
13. Bazyler played an important role in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), a case limiting the sovereign immunity of foreign countries and an important human rights precedent.
14. See BAZYLER p. 27 ; In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 319 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding "[d] ecades of improper behavior by the Swiss banks," including systematic document destruction and delay).
15. See, e.g . , Leon Wieseltier, Assets, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 1998, at 98 ("I would rather grieve than sue"); Gabriel Schoenfeld, Holocaust Reparations -A Growing Scandal, COMMENTARY, Sept. 2000, at 1.
16. See BAZYLER p. xii ("The unique features of the American justice system are precisely those factors that made the United States the only forum in the world where the Holocaust claims could be heard today."). In comparison, consider this from a Swiss scholar lawyers and not the judges, even those he admires.17 When it comes to righting great historical injustices, Eizenstat's view seems to be that litigation is not a necessary evil; it is an unnecessary evil. At every turn, the lawsuits made his job more difficult. The suits stirred up chauvinism, he says, at a time when cool heads were needed. They placed the tone of U.S.-European relations under the influence of a small number of egotistical, self-promoting lawyers with the ability to make inflated demands on U.S. allies. In contrast, Eizenstat venerates statesmen, people like Otto Lamsdorf, guided by national and multinational interest and prepared to seize upon an historical moment for reconciliation.18
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLASS ACTION: LITIGATING ON BEHALF OF THE COLLECTIVE
Holocaust survivors filed four kinds of actions: (1) suits against the three largest Swiss banks19 alleging self-dealing and theft as the banks blocked the efforts of Survivors and their heirs to claim tens of thousands of Swiss bank accounts that had been opened for safekeeping by now-deceased family members of these claimants before or during World War II; (2) suits against European insurance companies for failing to pay death benefits on policies purchased by Holocaust victims;20 (3) suits against multinational businesses whose exploitation of slave labor allowed them to flourish during the War and to recover quickly afterward;21 and (4) suits against art collectors, reacting to the Holocaust restitution cases: "Where I come from, the prevailing view of adjudication remains relatively formalist, perhaps too much so. The main concern is to cabin judicial power." Samuel P. 21. An estimated ten million people, Jews and also many non-Jews from Eastern Europe, were forced into Nazi Germany's slave labor force. Most worked for private (Vol. 102:1152 dealers, and even world renowned museums whose collections included artwork plundered from the private collections of Holocaust victims.22 Much of this was complicated class action litigation,23 with class members often having more allegiance to local Holocaust survivor organizations than to the large Jewish umbrella organizations that had taken the lead in confronting the Swiss banks and other defendants and that had dominated all matters of Holocaust reparations since the early 1950s. The class action suits were to some extent a challenge to these preexisting allegiances.
In the typical class action lawsuit, the ties among class members are a creation of the legal process. Those ties emanate from one thing: plaintiffs were inj ured by the same product, they were misled by the same brokerage firm, they were overcharged by the same utility. Rule 23 creates a grouping of individuals and claims, but one that is artificial and ephemeral. Before the complaint is filed, class members do not even know one another. After the litigation is over, they likely will go back to having nothing to do with one another. In this context, Rule 23's purposes are procedural and practical: There must be common questions of fact or law applicable to all claims,24 a limited fund for recovery,25 or something else to indicate that litigation as a class is the most efficient way to proceed. Nothing in the class certification process invites a court to pause over whether or not the putative class is composed of members who have any real connection to one another that predates the filing of the complaint.
Several ramifications follow from this. In the typical commercial class action suit, damages are the sum of the inj uries to each of the members of the class. The whole is equal to the sum of the parts. There is no entity separate from the class members, no disembodied collective that has sustained injury in its own right, an inj ury distinct from that suffered by individuals.
In the human rights class action, the situation is often different. The ties among class members are more likely to predate the litigation and to be lasting and deep. Suit is brought on behalf of people who have suffered similar atrocities, often for the same reasons. Holocaust victims were singled out because of traits central to their identity: religion,26 race,27 sexual preference,28 and disability.29 Subsequent to such persecution and atrocity, victims can be expected to form tight bonds to one another and to the persecuted group. They survived while others perished. A human rights class action composed of class members with this perspective is quite unlike one that temporarily aligns a million people all of whom owned the same automobile with the same safety defect.
In addition to being grounded in shared experience, the Holocaust suits were "collective" in the sense that they were strongly supported by many who were not part of the plaintiff class. They were supported in this way because of the identity-reinforcing nature of persecution in general and the Holocaust in particular.30 The filing of Holocaust suits also triggered financial support, research help, public relations activities, and political clout stretching far beyond the plaintiff class. This help came from the larger universe of Holocaust survivors, from major international Jewish organizations, from Jewish foundations, and from prominent Jewish individuals, many of whom were not Holocaust survivors themselves or children of Survivors. These lawsuits became their struggle because, for them, support was a duty of group membership.
The collective nature of the endeavor is underlined by Eizenstat's richly detailed account of the first meeting, in Bern, between the leadership of the World Jewish Congress (WJC)31 and the three largest Swiss banks: Credit Suisse (CS), Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC), and 26. For Nazi Germany, Jews were not only members of a religion, they were members of a race. The Nuremberg laws were race-based legislation. Their prohibitions applied based on a person's hereditary Jewishness, not religious practice, affiliation, or belief. See 1 SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933 PERSECUTION, -1939 PERSECUTION, , at 151-55 (1997 .
27. Roma, also known as Gypsies, were considered to be "carriers of alien blood" and were barred from having sexual contact with Germans under the Nuremberg laws. Beginning in 1936, Robert Ritter of the University of Tiibingen, with the backing of the SS, the German Research Society and the Reich Health Ministry, concluded that Gypsies were 90% racially impure. That conclusion became the basis for their segregation, deportation, and extermination. See 1 SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933 PERSECUTION, -1939 PERSECUTION, , at 204 (1997 .
28. During the Nazi period, some ten to fifteen thousand homosexuals were incarcerated and many others were killed in concentration camps. Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS). Edgar Bronfman and Israel Singer of the WJC are there as intermediaries and group spokesmen, a position with a long lineage in Jewish history.32 They are there on behalf of the Jewish People as a whole.33 They have not come to discuss individual bank accounts or individual cases. They have come to resolve the entire controversy surrounding dormant bank accounts belonging to Jewish depositors.34 They want to create a transparent process for identifying all Holocaust-related accounts, a process that will be regarded as fair not only by claimants but by all members of the Jewish community who are already rallying behind the claimants.
The Swiss bankers are hesitant about the wholesale nature of what Bronfman and Singer propose. For fifty years the banks have done well for themselves by denying claims one at a time. They have successfully resisted muted calls for a comprehensive audit of all accounts in which there has been no activity since the 1940s. Beginning right after the War's end, they eluded any serious accounting to the Allied victors with respect to gold and proceeds that had made their way from Germany to Switzerland. They stick to this strategy. They brush aside Bronfman's and Singer's call to do more. Instead, they offer $32 million to settle everything.
To Bronfman and Singer, the offer feels like a proposed payoff, a token payment to make them go away.35 It also suggests that the leading bankers in Europe are somehow unaware that the rules have changed. For fifty years the Swiss banking industry has rejected claimants based on a variety of legalisms: lack of sufficient account 32. The role of spokesman for the Jews goes back to Moses and Aaron in the Book of Exodus and repeats itself throughout Jewish history. During the Holocaust, representative Jewish councils were recognized by Nazi Germany and required to implement the harshest measures on the Jewish population, such as choosing who was fit for work and who would be sent to death camps in the East. See LUCY S. DA WIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 1933 -1945 , at 301-26 (1975 . For an account of the agonizing choices made by the Jewish leaders of the Lodz Ghetto, see LUCJAN DOBROSZYCKI, THE CHRONICLE OF THE LODZ GHETTO: 1941 GHETTO: -44 (1987 information,36 lack of proof of the death of the account owner,37 lack of assets still left in the account after having been churned by fees.38 That approach has worked for a long time. One at a time, claimants gave up.
By the 1990s, the rules have changed. 40. It is one of the great ironies of the Holocaust cases that they run so far counter to old Jewish stereotypes. Dating at least as far back as the Gospels, Jews are portrayed as legalistic, as pedantically concerned with technical rules rather than with simple justice. In the Holocaust cases, the claims advanced by Jewish victims were not legalistic at all. They were based on appeals to equity, on the unfairness of requiring complete documentation from people whose homes and businesses had been ransacked and destroyed, people who had been forcibly transported across Europe, imprisoned, and traumatized. In contrast, the arguments advanced by the banks and also by various insurance companies were highly legalistic and technical: failure to meet the statute of limitations, lack of sufficient documentation, and so forth. ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997 , at 49 (noting that a plan to distribute income from fund of Swiss National Bank's gold reserves was opposed by Christoph Blocher, a populist Swiss politician who characterized the Eizenstat Report as an example of "foreign pressure"); Regula Ludi, The Swiss Case, in CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 80, http://www .ces.fas.harvard.edu/;working_papers/LudiDreyfus.pdf. Imperfect Justice contains Eizenstat's defense of the Report ("(M]y presidential mandate was to set forth the facts and the conclusions, however harsh") and his mea culpa ("A few ill-chosen words in my foreword would set off the final avalanche with Switzerland. In retrospect, the same points could have been made less provocatively."). EIZENSTAT pp. 108-09.
51. The first was the so-called Bergier Commission established by the Swiss government with Jean-Fran�ois Bergier, a Swiss historian, at its helm. The second was the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (ICEP), formed pursuant to an agreement among the Swiss banks, the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO), and Israel's Jewish Agency. EIZENSTAT p. 69. The latter is commonly referred to as the Volcker Committee, for its chairman, Paul Volcker, who was formerly chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors under Presidents Carter and Reagan. The mandate of the Volcker Committee was to carry out an independent audit of all accounts in Swiss banks that might contain assets belonging to victims of Nazi persecution. It carried out this mandate on its own timeframe, one that was independent of litigation taking place in the U.S., with extraordinary thoroughness at a staggering total cost of $200 million. EIZENSTAT p. 72. The Holocaust Restitution Movement has mushroomed into transnational public law litigation on a grand scale.6() Though the various restitution cases (the Swiss, the German, the Austrian, the French) are separate from one another, they come together in the public mind. Swiss-American relations sour.61 Anti-Semitism rises.62 169, 193-201 (1987) .
61. EIZENSTAT p. 98. (quoting the chairman of Credit Suisse as explaining that the Swiss middle class opposed the whole reparations process and that "anti-American sentiment was growing in Switzerland"). Eizenstat also quotes from a leaked cable authored by Carlo
The conflict is no longer driven by individual stories. It is now about the Swiss, French, Austrian, and German pasts and the collective Jewish future.
III. WHY Now? WHY HERE?
The foreword to Imperfect Justice is written by Elie Wiesel. He, more than anyone, has assumed the role of translating the Holocaust to the non-Jewish world: to millions of his readers, to Ronald Reagan,63 to the Nobel Prize Committee.64 He asks: "Why this late concern for stolen money and wealth?65 Jagmetti, Swiss Ambassador to the U.S., recommending that the Swiss government "wage war" against its opponents. Among those opponents were Americans who were becoming increasingly aggressive in their attitude toward Switzerland. 63. In 1985, President Ronald Reagan agreed to make a Presidential visit to a military cemetery in Bitburg, Germany. The cemetery contained the remains not only of ordinary German soldiers but also those of Waffen SS troops. Wiesel and others publicly called upon the President to cancel the visit. He did not. What followed, however, were several exchanges that amounted to a nationwide seminar on the Holocaust, which some Americans were learning about for the first time. Wiesel is a messenger to mankind, his message is one of peace, atonement and human dignity. His belief that the forces fighting evil in the world can be victorious is a hard won belief. His message is based on his own personal experience of total humiliation and of the utter contempt for humanity shown in Hitler's death camps. The message is in the form of a testimony, repeated and deepened through the works of a great author. The question is susceptible of many answers. First, there is Wiesel's own response: "The task of protecting the memory of the dead was conceived by us as so noble, so painful, and so compelling that we considered it undignified and unworthy to think of anything else, and surely not bank accounts [.] "66 It is the perspective of an individual victim and a spokesman for many victims, moved by calls for justice but also wary of mixing the sacred and the profane. 67 It also calls to mind the phrase Hannah Arendt used in witnessing the trial of Adolf Eichmann: "the banality of evil."68 The pursuit of compensation invariably brings to light both the monstrous and the prosaic, the horrific and the petty. The nature of litigation is that it unearths much banality, in this case the banality of profit,69 the banality of bureaucracy,70 the banality of allowing human tragedy to be buried underneath mind-numbing legalese.71 For individual victims,
67. See EIZENSTAT pp. ix-x (Wiesel was reluctant to "define the greatest tragedy in Jewish history in terms of money"). Wiesel declined to be head of one of the funds set up by the Swiss banks. (1963) . Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi official most in charge of carrying out the Final Solution, was tried by an Israeli court, found guilty and executed.
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
69. Austria was an especially methodical example of mass theft. A Property Exchange was created to confiscate Jewish property and transfer it to so-called Aryans, mostly Nazi party members. All items were carefully catalogued and documented. Jews were required to sign declarations disclaiming further ownership of the property. See Itamar Levine, Inst. of the World Jewish Congress The Fate of Stolen Jewish Properties: The Cases of Austria and the Netherlands, Policy Study No. 8, at 5-9 (1997).
70. One survivor of Buchenwald described an insurance company's response to his request for payment on the family's insurance policies:
They stated that I would have to produce a death certificate and copies of the relevant insurance policies before they would process the claims. I explained that Hitler did not pass out death certificates and that all family insurance documentation was confiscated by the Third Reich.
They declined my request to retrieve from Generali's own files the insurance and annuity policies sold to my family. The officials said that Generali could not help me and they had me forcibly removed from the premises by a security guard. I was humiliated.
BAZYLER p. 119.
The settlement agreement in In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation defines the term Claims or Settled Claims as follows:
[A)ny and all actions, causes of action, claims, Unknown Claims, obligations, damages, costs, expenses, losses, rights, promises, and agreements of any nature and demands whatsoever, from the beginning of the world to now and any time in the future, arising from or in connection with the actual or alleged facts occurring on or before the date of this Settlement Agreement, whether in law, admiralty or equity, whether class or individual, under any international, national, state, provincial, or municipal law, whether now accrued or asserted hereafter arising or discovered, that may be, may have been, could have been or could be brought in any jurisdiction before any court, arbitral tribunal, or similar body against any Releasee directly or indirectly, for, upon, by reason of, or in connection with any act or omission in any way relating to the Holocaust, World War II and its prelude and aftermath, For those accustomed to a post-Chayes world of public law litigation,72 Bazyler takes us on a brief tour of formalism and the preeminence of state sovereignty in the decades when courthouse doors repeatedly closed in the faces of Holocaust survivors. It is, he shows, a myth that Survivors idly sat on their claims, allowing statutes of limitations to run out. Many vigorously pursued restitution soon after the War's end, only to have claims dismissed. These initial efforts came at a time when judicial power was less expansive and the individual had not yet secured a place in international law.73
In the 1960s, class action suits were attempted, only to be dismissed because the claims were seen as posing political questions or as being otherwise non-justiciable.74 Slave labor actions were brought unsuccessfully against German companies.75 Other actions were dismissed because statutes of limitations were applied rigidly.76 In yet other instances, Survivors became trapped in absurd Catch-22s. For instance, Jews were stripped of their German citizenship when forced to flee Germany. That made them stateless persons from the perspective of German law. Other countries, however, deemed them Assets, and/or Slave Labor, or any prior or future effort to recover on such claims directly or indirectly from any Releasee.
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFs_Eng/exhibitltoPlanofAllocation.pdf.; cf. Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 1 LEGIS. AFF ., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 39 (stating that lawyers in the Holocaust cases and African American slavery cases "abandon the vocabulary of human rights and repair to the more quotidian language of property and restitution law"). [ 89. Events were also influenced by the Clinton Administration's receptiveness, at the highest levels, to Survivors and their claims for restitution. On two occasions, President Clinton sent personal letters to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, urging the German government to contribute more money to the overall settlement. EIZENSTAT pp. 243, 248-49. it.90 Coming to terms with the past was, for some, a cost of reunification and, for others, a moral gateway to the fu ture. For the Swiss, the end of the Cold War and the rising influence of the EU meant less ability to go it alone on such things, as bank secrecy laws and money laundering. In France, de Gaulle's strategy of complete denial had become less useful.91 For a million non-Jewish former slave laborers living in Eastern Europe, the fall of Communism meant the end of the social safety net. It meant poverty and bitterness toward those (Jews) who had received decades of reparations from Germany while they had received none.92 The influx of a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union had ramifications for Israel's orientation toward the Holocaust.93 A country that for decades had experienced a drift away from Europe, as refugees from Arab countries came to make up much of the population, suddenly welcomed the largest wave of European immigrants since the state's founding. Among the new immigrants were many who were personally familiar with old-fashioned European anti-Semitism.
From 1945 to 1995, there were also profound changes in the United States, changes that influenced the receptivity of American Jews to the Holocaust restitution movement. The civil rights era and the further diversification of America made it possible to live free of pervasive anti-Semitism. American Jews became able to enjoy a social acceptability that was an historical oddity.94 Under these new circumstances, they did the opposite of what might be expected. Rather than put the Holocaust behind them as an earlier generation had done,95 they clung to it. They explored the period from 1933 to 
See generally HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN AMERICA (1992).
95. See EIZENSTAT p. 13 (in the decades immediately after the War, "the attempted extermination of European Jewry had been buried in public consciousness").
1945 in extraordinary detail.96 People who otherwise had little in common and no religious affiliation shared the pain of a common historical memory.97 The Holocaust became communalized. Community bonds were reinforced through the creation of an extraordinary number of films, novels, plays, museums, memorials, works of art, works of history, public education programs, video archives, Internet sites, and an annual day of remembrance.98 American Jews became, in certain respects, more of a collective as a result of the Holocaust.
In sum, both Eizenstat and Bazyler demonstrate that the rise of the Holocaust restitution movement took place in the wake of major legal and political changes and the evolution of a collective Jewish confrontation with the Holocaust. The Cold War ended before the last Survivors had died off. There was a window, albeit a small one, for a final accounting of the past. The timing of the Holocaust cases was not accidental. Historical and legal transformations had brought the restitution movement to that point.
Often overlooked, however, is the large extent to which the Holocaust restitution movement was the product of changes in procedural law. Holocaust cases were not brought in Switzerland or Germany. They were brought in courts in the United States, where five decades of legal reform had brought about a profound change in procedural law. The plaintiffs in the Holocaust cases, like other plaintiffs, were drawn to American courts by the fruits of a procedural revolution that began just as the German legal system was headed into the Nazi abyss. By the 1990s, U.S. procedural law was extraordinary in its ability to allow plaintiffs with small claims and small means to take on bigger opponents. It was also extraordinary in holding out the possibility of collective justice through adjudication.
The late 1930s brought the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), a standardized set of procedural rules that were destined to 97. See EIZENSTAT p. 6 ("Holocaust memory is one of the few uniting themes in American Jewish life").
98. See, e.g. , supra works noted in note 96. exert enormous influence on the American conception of civil litigation. Not only did the FRCP introduce important innovations such as notice pleading, a more liberal approach to joining parties and claims, and wider access to discovery, they also cut through much of the formalism that had previously characterized civil practice in American courts.99 Another watershed was International Shoe,100 which placed the law of personal jurisdiction on an expansive trajectory. Coupled with the attractiveness of the American economic market, International Shoe and its progeny101 made foreign defendants of all stripes far more susceptible to suit in the United States than previously.102 Extraterritorial jurisdiction was further expanded by new applications of agency103 and conspiracy.104 The law of remedies and standing responded to the civil rights movement, the consumer movement, and the environmental movement.105 By the 1980s the class action had become the great leveler in conflicts between many small claimants and the world's largest corporate entities.106
These procedural changes mattered. Had Survivors sought to file the Holocaust restitution cases in 1945, they might not have attracted counsel. The suits required a formidable amount of work, the need to advance considerable expenses, and, at that time, offered the prospect of only a modest recovery. Absent some way of grouping the cases together, few would be financial winners.
When some lawyers in the immediate postwar era nonetheless did boldly file actions, the suits typically did not survive procedural hurdles. For circumstances in which all relevant events had occurred in one place, a court might still apply the law of the forum or the law of some other place.114 In 1945, awards of punitive damages were rare.115 By 1995, punitive damages had become so common and so large that the Supreme Court began to rein them in.116
In 1945, litigation was a weak element in any restitution strategy. Half a century later, changes in procedural law had altered the equation.117
IV ARE THE HOLOCAUST CASES A MODEL FOR OTHERS?
The victims of other historical injustices are filing suits in U.S. courts. So are their heirs. In some cases, they are here for many of the same procedural reasons that brought the Holocaust cases to the U.S., especially the availability of class actions. If the financial success of the Holocaust cases was a function of trends in substantive law, procedural law, and geopolitics, what are the prospects for other reparation movements?
Imperfe ct Justice and Holocaust Justice attempt to gauge the likely impact of the Holocaust cases on other movements. Bazyler concludes that one of the "enduring legacies" of the Holocaust restitution movement is the "precedent it has set for addressing other inj ustices of the past. "118 Eizenstat observes, "Other victims of human rights violations have already followed our model."119 There is some but a race down to the lower common denominator" and that choice of law in the United States is characterized by much confusion). evidence to support these views. Randall Robinson argues that if Jews were entitled to billions of dollars for Nazi persecution over a twelve year period, African Americans are entitled to at least as much from White Americans.120 The first Pan-African conference on reparations and colonialism called for colonialism-based reparations, citing "historic precedents" including "payments of restitution to the Jews."121 Congressman John Conyers has repeatedly introduced bills calling for a formal study of the desirability and feasibility of reparations for African Americans.122 He relies in part on the example of Jewish survivors of World War II. 123 These comparisons between restitution for Holocaust-era wrongs and restitution for other historical inj ustices can be enlightening but also misleading. They suggest an underlying similarity to all oppression. Slavery in one generation is like slavery in another. Victims of one form of inj ustice can take heart in the victories of victims of other injustices. But important aspects of the Holocaust restitution movement differentiate it from the restitution sought by others, and other reparations movements need to be cautious about following the Holocaust model too closely. It may not be as useful as many seem to think.
One can see this by returning to the relationship between the individual and the collective briefly explored above. Clearly, there were collective aspects to the Holocaust litigation. Individual claims were consolidated into class actions. The settlement negotiations involved not only the lawyers for the class but also representatives of the World Jewish Congress. In submissions filed in connection with class certification and court approval of the settlement agreement, many concerns about the collective surfaced: Was the future of the Jewish People in revitalizing the dying communities of Eastern Europe or in channeling resources to younger and potentially more vibrant communities elsewhere? More generally, the potential impact of these cases on the collective was always a kind of "brooding omnipresence. "124 The decision to litigate had been made from the perspective of Jews living in North America. But what about the potential negative consequences of that decision for Jewish communities in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe?
Notwithstanding these communal aspects of the cases, at the remedy stage the balance tipped in favor of the individual rather than the group. The many thousands of individual claims that had been zipped up into a class action complaint were, at the remedy stage, unzipped into many thousands of individual claims again. There were no legal claims advanced on behalf of the large collective. The complaints did not seek damages on behalf of the "Jewish People" or the "Jewish community of Romania." They could not. No credible legal theory could be mustered for why such a collective entity is a proper plaintiff in a U.S. court. Even with its liberal joinder rules, U.S. procedural law does not embrace the remedial aspirations of groups that lack legal personality, no matter how much those groups in fact embody collective aspirations.125 If the goal of other reparations movements is money damages for harm done to a collective as suchharm that is distinct from inj ury to individual members of the collective -the Holocaust cases did not achieve that result. Instead, they showed that class-action law in the United States was never designed with human rights class actions in mind.
The most vivid illustration of this was during the court's evaluation of the settlement and plan of allocation in the Swiss banks case. At one critical juncture, collective restitution was a possibility. That juncture arrived when it became clear that the $1.25 billion in settlement funds would be more than enough to pay the claims of the deposited-assets subclass, 126 the refugee subclass, 127 and the slave labor 124. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) . Holmes was referring to the common law, which in his view was not a brooding omnipresence.
125. In other instances, procedural law is less grudging. For people who are equity owners of a corporation, the law provides a device to vindicate their collective interest; the corporation can sue and be sued.
126. The Settlement Agreement defines "Deposited Assets" as anything of value deposited in any Swiss bank prior to May 9, 1945 by a Victim or Target of Nazi Persecution. See Class Action Settlement Agreement, at 1 (Jan. 26, 1999), www.swissbankclaims.com. PDFs_Eng/exhibitltoPlanofAllocation.pdf. The members of the deposited-assets subclass are those with claims to such assets. Id. at 8.2(a).
127. This subclass consisted of Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution who sought entry into Switzerland in order to avoid persecution but were excluded, deported, or mistreated. See id. at 8.2(e).
subclasses.128 After payments to those groups of claimants, as much as $600 million might still be left over.129 After deciding not to provide funds to the looted-assets subclass,130 the Court invited proposals for cy pres remedies.131 Numerous proposals, falling into four main categories, were submitted:132 1) Distribute everything to individuals within the three subclasses defined by the settlement agreement, even if the administrative costs of distribution to some subclasses are extremely high;133
128. Individuals in these two subclasses were those who had performed slave labor in Switzerland, for Swiss companies elsewhere, or for non-Swiss entities that subsequently deposited the proceeds generated by that labor in a Swiss fi nancial entity. See id. at 8.l(c-d).
129. How did the settlement generate such a large sum of money not clearly targeted to specific recipients? The $1.25 billion settlement was never based on hard data. Neither side was prepared to wait three years for the Volcker Committee to complete its analysis of more than four million Swiss bank accounts to determine which ones had likely been owned by a Holocaust victim. Thus, in the settlement negotiations, no one knew what the total value of the deposited-asset claims would be. As it turned out, the plan of allocation set aside far more money for these claims than their eventual dollar value. There was also a second reason for the large pot of left-over money. The claims of one of the subclasses, the so-called looted assets subclass, posed special problems. The definition of that subclass, see infra note 130, was so broad as potentially to include all living Holocaust victims. Authorizing a distribution to the individuals in that subclass would have resulted in each claimant receiving a trivial distribution and with much funds consumed by the costs of administration. For these reasons, the Court decided it was unworkable to distribute any money to the looted-asset subclass. It was preferable to deal with the excess from the deposited-asset subclass and the amount not distributed to the looted-assets subclass by way of a cy pres remedy. 130. The Settlement Agreement defines Looted Assets as "[a)ssets actually or allegedly belonging in whole or in part to Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution that were actually or allegedly stolen, expropriated, Aryanized, confiscated, or that were otherwise wrongfully taken by, at the request of, or under the auspices of, the Nazi Regime." Settlement Agreement § 8.2(b).
131. The cy pres doctrine first developed in the law of trusts and estates. In that context, it provides flexibility when a bequest cannot be carried out because of subsequent changes in law or facts. A court employing the cy pres doctrine can order that funds be put to another use that is consistent with the testator's general intent. See, e.g., Fay v. Hunster,181 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir.1950) (allowing funds to be given to existing home for the aged where money was insufficient to build and maintain entirely new institution). Beginning in the 1970s, the cy pres concept was applied to analogous issues in class action law, such as when funds generated by settlement or by trial verdict turn out to be larger than the sum of all claims. Under these circumstances, the court may order that the funds be directed to their next best use. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F. 2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that district court may set aside portion of settlement proceeds for programs designed to assist the class provided it designates and supervises specific programs); United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1983), aff d 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that where impossible to trace specific oil price overcharges, funds to be used for federal energy conservation programs).
132 See Summaries of Proposals Received by the Special Master, http:/lwww. swissbankclaims.com.
133. Support for this view lay in the fact that suit had been brought on behalf of a specific, defined class of individuals. They, not others, would have faced res judicata and issue preclusion if the suits had been unsuccessful. As Professor Burt Neuborne put it:
[Vol. 102:1 152 2) After fully compensating members of the first two subclasses, distribute any left over amount to other Holocaust survivors, even those whose Holocaust inj uries have no nexus to Swiss banks or to Switzerland; 3) After fully compensating members of the first two subclasses, allow any left over amount to be spent on projects that will address the future needs of the Jewish people.134 Projects funded in this way need not specifically serve the population of Holocaust survivors; 4) After fully compensating members of the first two subclasses, distribute some of the left over amount to combat problems similar to those confronted by Jews during the Holocaust: intolerance, xenophobia, indifference to the plight of refugees. Such projects need not specifically serve Holocaust survivors or even be directed at anti-Semitism specifically. Most Holocaust survivor organizations favored the second approachY5 Prominent Jewish organizations favored the third. They argued that in considering what to do with funds available for restitution, one ought to acknowledge that injury and suffering was not confined to individuals. Under the cy pres doctrine, the Jewish People as a whole could be regarded as a victim of the Holocaust. Jewish life in all its forms had suffered immeasurably. Sixty years later, Jewish communities around the globe are still reeling from the loss of one third of the worldwide Jewish population, the dislocation of millions more, the largest mass theft in history, and the fear that in some form it could happen again. For these reasons, the World Jewish Restoration Organization {WJR0)136 maintained that a substantial [T] he fund is the result of the settlement of a lawsuit involving precisely defined legal claims against Swiss banks. In working out a plan of allocation and distribution, Judge Korman, Special Master Gribetz and I are under a legal duty to attempt to distribute the funds to persons who have valid legal claims against the Swiss bank defendants.
See BAZYLER p. 283 (citing Letter from Burt Neubome to Leo Rechter, July 2002). Neubome, a professor of Jaw at New York University, was appointed by the court to serve as special settlement counsel in the Swiss banks case. portion of any surplus funds should be used to make some effort to replace what had been destroyed -the cultural and spiritual cradle of Ashkenazic Jewry137 -and to address the needs of Jewish communities worldwide, even those geographically far away from Europe.
The latter views were rejected. Judge Korman ruled that priority was to be given to the individual needs of living Holocaust survivors.138 Nearly all leftover funds were to go to elderly Holocaust survivors living in the former Soviet Union, many with extremely critical day-to day needs.139 The court's order sought to alleviate current suffering whether or not causally related to past injustice, and not to fund forward-looking measures, such as Holocaust education, Holocaust scholarship, or rebuilding the properties and communal infrastructure of the Eastern European past.
What conclusions can one draw from the court's ruling? The result reflected the dire circumstances of Survivors in the former Soviet Union, but not just that. It was also shaped by the limitations of American class action law. The complaint had been filed on behalf of specific people. The subsequent settlement agreement had defined three subclasses. Nothing on the face of Rule 23 authorized the court to look beyond these claimants and these subclass definitions to a wider Jewish community that had been impacted. Nothing in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 makes reference to whether a class action suit embodies the aspirations of a collective and not solely members of the class. In this respect our current jurisprudence under Rule 23, while perhaps adequate for much tort and commercial class action litigation, falls short of the pursuit of full and useful reparations in human rights class actions, where the effects of widespread and severe oppression go beyond individual injury.
Other restitution movements sometimes seem to misunderstand or ignore this aspect of the Holocaust cases when they view them as precedent for group-oriented remedies.140 They are not. Relief for Eizenstat reports one leader of a Slovakian-Jewish community as saying that the WJRO "treats us like retarded children." EIZENSTAT p. 40. Vol. 102:1152 individuals is what triumphed. The losses suffered by the whole were not recognized.
Leaders of other reparations movements do not seek individualized justice of this sort.141 The African American community does not press for reparations so that every African American will receive a reparations check in the mail.142 What is sought are better schools, better housing, and a pool of capital that will allow Black owned businesses to flourish. The demands of the Herero People against Germany focus on the equivalent of a new Marshall Plan geared toward revitalizing a collective that was nearly wiped out in the early part of the 20th century.143 Suits relating to Shell Oil's treatment of the Ogoni People seek broad collective remedies aimed at restoring the land in the Ogoni region of Nigeria and the Ogoni People's self sufficiency.144 Among those advancing or supporting suits against corporations that allegedly propped up the Apartheid regime are many who oppose individual remedies and favor instead that funds be spent on communal needs.145 Goals of this sort, however, were not furthered by In re Holocaust Vi ctim Assets Litigation, which does not augur well for those who seek cy pres remedies that go far beyond directly benefiting class members.
V. THE LEGISLATIVE CASE FOR COLLECTIVE REMEDIES
If Rule 23 did not yield truly collective remedies, why are the Holocaust cases sometimes regarded as milestones with respect to group rights?
The non-Swiss Holocaust cases, settled outside the context of Rule 23, did produce some collective remedies. They did so by acting as a spur to treaty negotiation and legislation. The German slave labor cases, for instance, were resolved through a bilateral treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.146 There was no Rule 23 settlement and no district court approval or supervision. Seven percent of the settlement amount (DM 700 million out of a total of DM 10 billion) flowed into a "Future Fund" designed to "send a forward-looking signal of continuing moral and political responsibility."147 The Austrian-U.S. treaty established a similar fund, the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, from which monies have been spent on Holocaust-related education and scholarship.148
Moreover, the Holocaust cases, to a greater extent than any previous human rights litigation in U.S. courts, allowed for the articulation (both in court and in the wider public discourse) of the affirmative case for collective remedies. That affirmative case goes something like the following: A profound and lasting inj ury is done to a large number of people. Some are killed, some imprisoned, some enslaved. All are singled out for persecution because of characteristics that they share, characteristics that establish common bonds among them in a deep rather than a superficial way. By virtue of these common traits, these individuals regard themselves as a collective, as some form of coherent, identifiable group with an identity that endures over time. They are a product of shared history, and they have an expectation of a shared future.
multinational corporations as seeking to generate funds for broad social programs and the reconstruction and development of affected communities). [ Vol. 102:1152 If the persecution is vast and severe, there may come a point at which there emerges a harm to the collective that is distinct from the injuries suffered by individual members. Members of the group, even those never physically in harm's way, may suffer indirectly from persecution inflicted on others. The murder of intellectuals or religious leaders drains the collective of tradition, leadership, and optimism. Repression of artists and writers undermines the group's ability to preserve its language, literature, and artistic expression. Destroying sacred sites and exiling large numbers of individuals can render the group vulnerable to assimilation and loss of identity. If the group's numbers fall below a critical mass, its very survival may be in jeopardy. In each of these scenarios, there is a collective harm, one that is different from those inflicted on individual group members. The inj ury stretches geographically to places far from the site of atrocity. It also stretches into the future to those who are the collective's hopes for carrying its traditions forward.
The overall impact of sustained persecution and atrocity may be a sense of profound loss and confusion enduring far into the future, leaving behind an emaciated tradition and a People in danger of losing its soul. Analyzed in these terms, the Holocaust presents a compelling case of group inj ury and the need for group relief. The Final Solution was not primarily a plan for persecuting specific individuals. It was a blueprint for destroying an entire people.149 Hitler sought to destroy not individual Jews, not even merely all Jews, but also all facets of Jewish culture and Jewish contributions to Western civilization. The Nazi bonfire consumed all things even tangentially Jewish, sacred books and objects, scientific works,150 "degenerate art,"151 and 149. Scholars disagree as to whether genocide was inherent in Nazism from the outset. Compare SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933 PERSECUTION, -1939 (suggesting an evolution in Nazi policies toward Jews from marginalization to expulsion to genocide), with DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 131-63 (1997) (arguing that the impulse toward genocide was present early on but that initial obstacles prevented Germany from immediately carrying out genocide and that Nazis nonetheless were "more consistent than it has generally been recognized" in moving toward total annihilation of European Jewry). 151. In 1927, the National Socialist Society for German Culture was fo rmed for the purpose of halting the "corruption" of art. The works deemed offensive included almost all of modern art, including Cubism, Surrealism, Expressionism, Dadaism, Impressionism, and Fauvism and any work produced by a Jewish artist. In 1937, Nazi authorities purged German museums of art that was deemed to reflect an aesthetic contrary to Aryan values. See generally Degenerate Art (Entartete Kunst), in A TEACHERS GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST, literature produced by highly secular and assimilated Jews.152 Future generations were targeted for destruction. The ultimate enemy was the possibility for Jewish renewal.
That goal was nearly realized. Before the War, Yiddish was spoken across Europe by more than ten million people. Hundreds of Yiddish newspapers circulated throughout Poland alone.153 Today the number of native speakers is measured in the thousands, probably too few to sustain it as a living language. The city of Vilna in Lithuania was a great center of scholarship in Jewish law. It was home to academies whose ideas and output influenced every community in the Jewish world.154 That unique world was destroyed when the Jews of Vilna were marched to the Ponary Forest to dig their own graves.155 Sixty years have passed and Vilna's unique contribution to Jewish life has not fully been recreated elsewhere.
Gone also are the shtetls156 of Eastern Europe, preserved in Roman Vishniac's pre-War black-and-white photographs.157 These villages were vast reservoirs of custom, not those of the intellectuals in Vilna but rather those of the millions living in poor rural communities with traditions on everything from how to conduct a marriage ceremony to what to name a child. The communities that nurtured these customs are gone, perhaps forever. Where once there were vital and creative Jewish communities of ideas and spirituality, today there is a vast Jewish cemetery. 158 Every Jewish community in the world today feels this loss. Even thriving communities in Israel are missing important bridges to the [Vol. 102:1152 past. The Holocaust has diminished the Jewish People in a way that is very real, albeit difficult to quantify.159
Although this group-oriented conception of inj ury faired poorly in U.S. courts, it has been central to the post-War dialogue between Germans and Jews for nearly sixty years. The conception of the Jewish People as an injured collective was built into the first German-Jewish reparations treaty, the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement.160 In negotiating that document, Germany might have insisted that all payments to claimants be made directly from the German treasury. It did not. From the start, the German commitment to pay reparations was an acknowledgment that a debt was owed from one people to another and not solely from Germany to individual victims. Moreover, the original design, which remains in place, was that representative Jewish organizations would have discretionary authority in deciding where funds should be directed so as best to repair the damage to the collective.161 Ultimately, two intermediaries were chosen: the State of Israel (for Survivors living in Israel)162 and the Claims Conference163 (for Survivors living elsewhere). In the former case, funds were spent on resettling Jewish refugees from Europe to Israel. In the latter case most of the reparations money was distributed to individual Holocaust survivors, but sizeable amounts went to fund projects aimed at the 162. The primary rationale offered for these payments was that Israel was entitled to reimbursement for absorbing 500,000 European Holocaust Survivors who had been brought to Israel as refugees at high resettlement costs. This public rationale, however, was in part crafted in order to create a climate in which receiving such payments from Germany would be acceptable to Israelis. See Heilig, supra note 161, at 176. "social and educational reconstruction" of Jewish communities around the world. 164 Over a period of fifty years, this collective approach to German Jewish reparations has drawn relatively little opposition. To the contrary, all German-Jewish discussion of Holocaust reparations has followed this basic framework. 165 Some injuries suffered by other groups can be seen in a similar light. The mass slaughter, enslavement, and dispossession of Native Americans calls out for collective remedies. To some extent, the U.S. government has acknowledged this.166 Chinese policy toward Tibet also has inflicted such extensive inj ury upon the collective that it is hard to imagine how the Tibetan people, its religion, and its way of life can substantially recover from decades of repression without a vigorous and imaginative set of collective remedies.167
If group injuries like these are real -real enough to be acknowledged in treaties and legislation -then why were they not recognized in the Swiss banks cases? Why also are the group injuries at the heart of more recently filed cases by other groups unlikely to be vindicated? Two very different sorts of reasons suggest themselves. One has to do with our legal system's aversion to speculative damages and attenuated c. ausation. The other, which goes more to the point of this essay, is the precarious relationship between the substantive law of human rights and the procedural law available to enforce it.
Collective remedies pose difficulties in terms of tracing a straight line between the remedy that has been ordered and any discernable remedial effect. These difficulties tend to be fatal in a legal system with many doctrines designed to filter out alleged damages that are speculative. Consider, for instance, some of the cy pres proposals in the Swiss case. The World Association of Belarusan Jewry sought $3.5 million for the creation and operation of schools to provide Jewish education in their community. 168 The YIVO Institute for Jewish Research requested funds to publish the YIVO Encyclopedia of the [Vol. 102:1152 History and Cu lture of Jews in Eastern Europe.169 Others proposed ways to revive the Yiddish languageY0
Although these proposals suggested plausible avenues for repairing the ways in which whole communities were devastated, they also presented serious problems of accountability. Reparations oriented litigation, to a far greater extent than treaties and legislation, has stalled at confronting difficult matters of proof and conceptualization. In a world in which no one variable can be held constant, how does one determine whether the Yiddish language would have died out on its own, through the Jewish People's ongoing encounters with modernity and assimilation? Would the State of Israel have come into being in the absence of the Holocaust? Do the contributions made by the State of Israel to the vitality of the Jewish People outweigh what was lost in the Holocaust?171 Specialized education programs may be a plausible response to a group's losses, but they may also be a means of empowering some group members (those who design the schools and control the curriculum) over others. Is that what court-ordered remedies should do in the context of human rights class actions?172
There is a second reason why the short-term future of the human rights class action is less than bright. When Rule 23 was overhauled in the 1960s, no one had in mind suits like the German slave labor litigation. Instead, reparations movements have made use of a procedural device that was designed with other kinds of litigation in mind. They do so because Congress has never enacted procedural rules specifically designed to litigate mass reparations claims in U.S. courts. From the beginning of the modern international human rights litigation movement, human rights suits in U.S. courts have been riding the same rails as those used to transport shareholders' derivative suits and ordinary commercial litigation, types of litigation that lack the collective quality typical of suits arising from mass 171. African American descendants of slaves seek remedies that are similarly difficult to correlate with actual injury. Robert Westley proposes that a private trust be established for the benefit of descendants of African American slaves and that trust funds be used to promote the "educational and economic empowerment" of the trust beneficiaries. See Westley, supra note 123. Randall Robinson argues in favor of creating residential educational facilities for Black children "at risk in unhealthy family and neighborhood environments," fully funded college tuition for qualified Black students, and funding for continued "broad civil rights advocacy" by Black organizations. See ROBINSON, supra note 120, at 244-45.
172. Of course individualized remedies can suffer from imprecision and lack of effica cy also. persecution. Indeed, there is a counterpart to this railroad analogy in substantive human rights law. Since the 1970s, the cause of action of choice for victims of human rights abuses committed abroad has been the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a statute enacted in 1789.173 It is the principal statute underlying the Holocaust slave labor cases, the Apartheid cases, and the recent cases brought by native communities allegedly targeted for persecution by governments and multinational corporations in pursuit of mineral exploration.174 As a human rights instrument, the ATCA is less than ideal. It was enacted in 1789, when the scope of international law -what the statute calls the "law of nations" -was so limited as not to include slavery or ethnic cleansing or massive wartime pillaging. At that time, it certainly did not extend to the behavior of non-State actors such as banks, insurance companies, and plantation owners. Nonetheless, for more than two decades, human rights litigators have sued under the ATCA because it was available, because there was little else, and because its broad language was capable of being interpreted to apply to violations of modem international law.
In the short term, the usefulness of the A TCA and Rule 23 to contemporary reparations movements will be modest. The human rights movement's early victories in ATCA cases175 have predictably led to a backlash, with strong opposition from big business,176 foreign governments,177 the foreign policy establishment,178 the ATCA's academic critics,179 and from the Bush administration.180 This opposition to A TCA litigation reached a critical mass when human rights class actions were seen as posing a real economic threat to transnational corporate investment, triggering a response by such influential pro-business lobbies as the International Chamber of Commerce181 and the U.S. Council for International Business.182 In what is increasingly being framed as a threat by human rights groups and the plaintiff's bar to the executive branch's ability to maneuver flexibly in the realm of foreign relations, Eizenstat's sympathies seem to be with the critics of the ATCA class action.183 His frustration with the new "plaintiffs' diplomacy"184 comes across in the many passages in Imperfe ct Justice when he decries having to 180. In the first major international human rights case to reach the Supreme Court in a decade, the Justice Department argued that continuing to permit sensitive human rights suits to go forward in U.S. courts could undermine the efforts of the Executive Branch to work with foreign governments:
The State Department has determined that, to the extent that the pending apartheid litigation impedes South Africa's domestic efforts to promote reconciliation and equitable economic growth, the litigation will undermine the United States' foreign policy objectives of promoting both foreign investment in South Africa and redress for the wrongs of apartheid.
negotiate with lawyers who, in his view, lack any concern for how their actions will affect the larger picture -the future of Jewish life in Europe, the impact of litigation on the accuracy of the historical record, the ability of European progressives to nudge their fellow citizens to look at the wartime record and the current policies without feeling under siege.185 When it comes to mass reparations and restitution, Eizenstat favors old-fashioned government-to-government negotiations.
Bazyler disagrees. He reminds us that fifty years of sporadic government-to-government talks on Holocaust restitution produced very little. Securing reparations for Holocaust victims was not a foreign policy priority for any of the countries from which victims had come or to which they had gone after the War, not even Israel. Essentially every post-War initiative related to Holocaust restitution or reparations has originated with NGOs (especially the Claims Conference) and victim organizations.
If Eizenstat's perspective currently seems to be gaining the upper hand, it is unlikely to be the final word. As he would likely acknowledge, the victims' movement is here to stay. Despite what might appear to be recent setbacks for the human rights litigation movement,186 there is no indication that the international system will substantially return to the days when reparations were purely a government-to-government matter. In fact there continue to be indications to the contrary. The subject of procedural mechanisms for awarding compensation to atrocity victims is recurrently on the table as new international tribunals are created and as the overall U.N. human rights system is reevaluated.187
The future of collective justice through litigation lies in these efforts. Supporters of the human rights class action in the United States should pay heed. An optimistic future will be found less in creative interpretations of Rule 23 than in continuing to pursue the procedural revolution launched in U.S. courts in the 1930s. Collective victims need procedural rules specifically written with human rights class actions in mind. Also needed are substantive legal instruments 185. See, e.g. , EIZENSTAT p. 250 (referring to the "lion's den, the plaintiffs' lawyers' holding room").
186. In the past year, for example, Belgium and Spain have taken steps to cut back on their courts' exercise of universal jurisdiction. See Peruvian Genocide Case, STS, Feb. 25, 2003 (No. 712/2003 that go beyond the ATCA.188 More generally, that means that human rights-specific procedural rules should be on the negotiating table domestically and internationally. Until now, most reparations movements have focused on immediate results and not on the procedural infrastructure for their own claims and for future claims like theirs. Even now, several years after the settlements in the Holocaust cases were reached, little effort has been expended to secure better procedural tools for other reparations claims. Little attention has been directed to the possibilities for procedural reform in the area of human rights enforcement.
In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, an old procedural order proved terribly ineffective in delivering compensation to victims of profound injustice. Over the course of fifty years, some of the inadequacies of that procedural order have been addressed. But only some. Still unaddressed are the unique injuries that result when mass atrocities are inflicted on collectives. The Holocaust cases overcame some of these procedural deficiencies. A monumental award of damages to millions of victims was achieved. But this result was accomplished not because Rule 23 was an effective human rights instrument, but because it was adequate for the case at hand, a case that benefited from many other sources of support, including the desire of Germany and Austria to close the books on Holocaust restitution, the relatively powerful diplomatic hand of the United States in the post-Cold War era, and public sympathy for the plaintiffs ' claims -a product of decades of Holocaust education. This was a unique confluence of forces. It will be difficult to replicate. Other victims of injustice should not count on being able to do so. Their path to recovery lies in creating new rules that address in detail the procedural means for enforcing the substantive norms at the heart of current and future reparations claims. The source of such rules will be in Congress, in treaty conferences, in the work of the new international tribunals,189 and in the example set by foreign legislation.190 
